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Abstract
We analyze expectations of the Dutch population ages 25 and older concerning future
generosity of state and occupational pensions, the main pillars of the Dutch pension
system. We use rotating panel data with monthly observations from 2006 until 2012 on
individuals’ subjective expectations concerning changes between now and ten or
twenty years from now in the purchasing power of occupational pensions and of old
age social security benefits, the eligibility age for old age social security benefits, and
the average retirement age ten or twenty years from now. We find significant variation
in expectations across socio-economic groups, with more pessimistic expectations
amongst higher educated and higher income groups. We also find that expectations
have gradually become more pessimistic since the onset of the economic and financial
crisis, in line with the plans for reforms that will reduce pension generosity.
JEL codes: D84, H55, J26
Keywords: Subjective probabilities, Old age social security, Occupational pensions
1 Introduction
In models of life cycle behaviour and inter-temporal decision making under uncertainty,
expectations play an important role. For example, consumption, saving, and labour sup-
ply decisions of individuals and households not only depend on their current tastes and
opportunities, but also on their expectations of future prices, their future income, etc.
(see, for example, Feldstein (1974)).
Future expectations often remain unobserved and traditional macro- or micro-
economic models typically make assumptions on how they are formed, e.g. assuming
rational expectations. The conclusions from these models may be biased if the assump-
tions on expectations are not satisfied. To solve the problem that expectations are
unobserved, many recent empirical studies aim at measuring expectations directly using
survey questions. See, for example, Manski (2004) for an assessment of the validity of
this approach and a recent special issue of Journal of Applied Econometrics (Bellemare
and Manski 2011). Other examples are Keane and Runkle (1990) on inflation expec-
tations, Dominitz and Manski (2005) on expectations of equity returns, Dominitz and
Manski (1997), Das et al. (1999) and Dominitz (2001) on income expectations, Hurd and
McGarry (1995) on length of life expectations, Stephens (2004) on job loss expectations,
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Benítez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) on retirement expectations, Dominitz andManski (2006)
and Chan and Stevens (2008) on pension expectations, and Delavande and Rohwedder
(2008) on expectations of old age social security income.
Pension expectations have become particularly relevant since in many industrialized
countries, the ageing of the population has led to a debate on the need for pension reforms
to keep the pension system sustainable (Lindbeck and Persson 2003; Zaidi 2010). Partic-
ularly since the economic and financial crisis, high retirement replacement rates can no
longer be taken for granted. Recent reforms reduce the generosity of guaranteed retire-
ment income and at the same stimulate additional voluntary pension savings, increasing
awareness of pension risks and individual responsibility.
In this paper, we analyze expectations of the Dutch population aged 25 and older
concerning the future generosity of the two main pillars of the Dutch system of income
provision to the elderly – first pillar old age social security benefits (AOW) and second
pillar occupational pensions (mandatory for almost all employees). As in many other
European countries, sustainability of income provision in old age has become an impor-
tant issue in public policy discussions due to the ageing of the population (Bovenberg
and Gradus 2008). Generous early retirement benefits are gradually being phased out
and replaced by actuarially fair flexible retirement systems. The debate has been rein-
forced by the financial and economic crisis, leading to additional pressure on old age
social security due to government budget concerns and due to pressure on occupational
pensions caused by the reduced value of the assets of occupational pension funds that
invest part of their clients’ pension savings in equity. The idea of working after the normal
retirement age of 65 years has gradually become a real option, although impediments
currently remain (Van Solinge and Henkens 2007), and current plans for reforms imply
that sooner or later, the state pension eligibility age and the normal retirement age will
shift from age 65 to 67; the main disagreement now seems to be on when this will hap-
pen, not whether it will happen or not. This makes it particularly interesting to analyze
how different socio-economic groups forecast the future of the Dutch pension system
and whether and how these forecasts have changed under the influence of the public
discussion and the financial and economic crisis.
Subjective beliefs are important for economic modelling, since they make it possible
to test assumptions on expectation formation like rational expectations, and, if neces-
sary, replace them by an expectation formation model that is supported by the subjective
beliefs data. In our sample, at each given point in time, all respondents are asked to pre-
dict the same outcome and in principle have access to the same information. The large
heterogeneity in reported expectations in our data reveals that in spite of this, they do
not have the same subjective distributions. One of the explanations for this could be that
some groups lack the proper cognitive skills or are not willing to invest time to form
their beliefs. Moreover, it is of interest to analyze to what extent reported beliefs are
explained by observable respondent characteristics or contain additional information at
the individual level.
Misguided expectations may have a negative impact on future well-being of vulnerable
groups in society (see, for example, Rohwedder and van Soest 2006). In particular, overly
optimistic beliefs may lead to under-saving. A recent study (De Grip et al. 2012) even
suggests that there is also a direct effect of expectations on well-being (implying that the
effect of overly optimistic beliefs on life-time well-being is not unambiguously negative.)
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It is therefore important to see whether different socio-economic groups have realistic
views of the future or not. This is not only useful for economists concerned with the
mechanisms behind the formation of beliefs but could also offer policy makers new ways
of designing effective solutions to prevent saving inadequacy among specific population
groups.
Since May 2006, monthly survey data were collected on the expectations of Dutch
households concerning occupational pensions, old age social security, and the average
retirement age ten or twenty years from the time of the interview. A subset of these
data was analyzed by Van der Wiel (2008) who focused on the relation between old
age social security expectations and savings decisions and Van der Wiel (2009) who
investigated the effect of the number of newspaper articles on the volatility of old age
social security expectations. We will not only analyze social security but also occupa-
tional pension and average retirement age expectations reported from June 2006 until
June 2012. We will investigate how they have changed over time, in particular, since
the onset of the financial and economic crisis, and how they vary with socio-economic
characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the sample design and the expectations questions. After that we discuss time trends and
age patterns in pension expectations, describing how the answers vary over time and
how this relates to the public policy debate in the Netherlands. In the Section titled
Empirical models of beliefs, we analyze some empirical models relating pension expecta-
tions to background characteristics. The final section concludes.
2 Sample design and survey questions
The survey was administered to members of the CentERpanel, an ongoing Internet panel
managed by CentERdata, a data collection and applied research institute affiliated with
Tilburg University. The sample is based upon a simple random sample from the popu-
lation in the Netherlands of ages 16 and older and consists of over 2000 households in
which one or more adults are invited to complete questionnaires at home every weekend
over the Internet. Households without Internet access are given access by CentERdata
so that the survey also covers households without Internet or without a personal com-
puter. About 75% of all panel members respond to the questions in a given weekend.
Rich background information about the panel respondents is available from previous
interviews.1
Each respondent answers the questions to the specific survey on pension expec-
tations once every three months. The total sample of respondents of ages 25 and
older was randomly split into three subsamples of about the same size. One sub-
sample gets the questions in January, April, July and October; the second subsample
in February, May, August and November, etc. This implies that there are observa-
tions for one third of the sample in each month except in May and June 2006 (the
first two months of the survey) when everyone was invited to participate instead of
one third.
In addition to the questions on future expectations that we will analyze, the survey
asks questions on other pension related issues, such as the respondents’ satisfaction
with several aspects of their pension provisions and the pension system in general; see
De Bresser and van Soest (2009).
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The expectations questions have been asked in the form of subjective probabilities.
According to Manski (2004), this is a much better way to elicit information on people’s
subjective distributions of future outcomes, providing more information than, for exam-
ple, simple point expectations. Subjective probability questions have been extensively
used and validated in US surveys, particularly the Health and Retirement Study, which has
subjective probability questions on many different topics, including the future employ-
ment status, length of life, and future inheritances and bequests (Juster and Suzman 1995;
Hurd 2009).
The first questions are about old age social security benefit levels (AOW: Algemene
Ouderdoms Wet). According to the current system, everyone who has been a resident in
the Netherlands from age 15 to age 65 is fully eligible for these benefits. The amount is
determined by the official minimum subsistence level2 and depends on partnership sta-
tus but usually not on earnings or employment history. There is one exception that may
matter for expectations: if one spouse is older than 65 and the other is younger than
65, the couple receives the amount for singles if the younger spouse has a paid job, but
the full amount for the couple if the younger spouse does not do any paid work; the
additional amount received in the latter case is called the “partner allowance”. It will be
abolished in 2015, and this has been announced long before the start of our survey in
2006. Respondents who are aware of this announced reform may incorporate it in their
expectations concerning future benefit levels. The wording of the first series of questions
was:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the purchasing power
of AOW benefits will on average be
– Less than now?
– At least 10 percent less than now?
– More than now?
– At least 10 percent more than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will definitely not
happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
Half of the sample got the questions with 10 years from now; the other half with 20 years
from now, with randomized assignment.3 All answers from 0 to 100 were allowed for;
consistency restrictions (e.g., second answer larger than the first one) were not imposed
and were indeed sometimes violated by the respondents. Note that the first and third
answer may well add up to less than 100 since people may attach a positive probability
to the event that purchasing power remains the same. This applies in particular to the
purchasing power of AOW benefits since, in the current system, they are fixed at the
minimum subsistence level and reforms proposed until now do not change that (though
for couples to whom the “Partner allowance” applies, the purchasing power of the total
benefit will decrease in 2015 – see above).
The second set of questions concerns the purchasing power of second pillar pensions.
Essentially all employees in the Netherlands participate in mandatory pension schemes
organized at the firm or industry level, which guarantees them a defined benefit occupa-
tional pension that increases with their earnings. There are differences across firms and
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industries in how the pension level varies with the pattern of life cycle earnings or whether
pension benefits keep track with inflation. The wording of the questions was similar to
that for AOW benefits:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the average purchasing
power of occupational pensions will be
– Less than now?
– At least 10 percent less than now?
– More than now?
– At least 10 percent more than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will definitely not
happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
The answers to these questions may be affected by the problems faced by occupational
pension funds due to the financial crisis. Many pension funds have experienced a reduc-
tion of the accumulated pension wealth of their clients due to falling stock prices, and in
response have announced that they will not compensate pension amounts for inflation in
the near future. In the long run, this may lead to much lower pension levels in real (pur-
chasing power) terms. Implicitly, the respondents are asked to forecast how much of the
inflation in the next ten or twenty years will not be compensated by increases in nominal
pensions – admittedly not an easy task.
The third set of questions is about the eligibility age for old age social security benefits:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the age at which people
are entitled to AOW benefits will on average be
– Higher than now?
– At least two years higher than now?
– Lower than now?
– At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will definitely not
happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
This question touches the core of the Dutch policy discussion starting in 2008 and
still continuing in 2012, which focuses on raising the eligibility age for AOW ben-
efits from 65 to 66 or 67 for cohorts that will reach age 65 after a certain date –
this date is also part of the discussion. The plan launched in September 2009 was
to implement the changes 10 years from now, not affecting those who are currently
older than 55; this plan was not implemented because the government stepped down
but a similar scheme was implemented later by the new government. Current plans
of the provisional government involve raising the eligibility age already earlier, that is,
also for older cohorts. How this will be implemented and whether special arrange-
ments will be made for specific occupations involving heavy physical effort is not
yet clear.
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The final set of questions we will analyze refers to the retirement age.4 The wording of
the questions about the retirement age is:
What do you think is the probability that 10/20 years from now the age at which people
stop working will on average be
– Higher than now?
– At least two years higher than now?
– Lower than now?
– At least two years lower than now?
Please answer on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, where 0 means it will definitely not
happen and 100 means it will certainly happen.
Although the current policy debate is more about postponing AOWbenefits than about
fixing the retirement age, the common view is that postponing entitlement to AOW ben-
efits from age 65 to 67 will lead to the same change in the normal retirement age. Earlier
retirement will remain possible, but with a pension level that is lowered in an actuarially
neutral way.
3 Time trends and age patterns in pension expectations
During the time period covered by our data, there have been several lively policy debates
on public and private pension reforms. Long before the financial and economic crisis, pol-
icy makers already saw the need to reform the public pension system due to the ageing of
the population (see, for example, Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008). The rising government
budget deficit during the crisis starting in 2008 has strengthened the need for reforms
of state pensions, but, partly due to the resignation of the government in early 2010 and
the long time it took to form a new government, final decisions have been postponed.
Because the government fell, final decisions have not yet been taken in July 2012. Occupa-
tional pension funds, confronted with negative returns on their investments in the stock
market (and low interest rates reducing projected coverage ratios), have emphasized the
need to reduce the generosity of pension benefits, involving lower benefits or later retire-
ment, to avoid pension premiums continuing to rise. In this section, we investigate how
the general public’s expectations of the generosity of the pension system have changed
during the time period 2006 - 2012 and to what extent they have responded to the policy
discussion.
Figure 1 shows how the average answers to the probability questions on the purchasing
power of AOW benefits have developed over the time period covered by the survey (May
2006 - June 2012).5 Before discussing the time patterns, some other findings are worth
noting. First, the average probabilities are consistent, in the sense that the first probability
(“less than now”) always exceeds the second one (“at least 10% less than now”), the third
probability (“more than now”) always exceeds the fourth one (“at least 10% more”), and
the sum of the first and third probability is always much less than 100%, implying that, on
average, a substantial positive probability of about 30% is attached to the event that the
purchasing power of AOW benefits will not change. This is in line with the notion that
receiving AOW benefits should only put household income on the official poverty line,
giving a fixed purchasing power level over time.
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Figure 1 The probability of changes in the purchasing power of AOW benefits 10 or 20 years from
now.
Second, the figures are asymmetric, revealing a general sense of “pessimism”: the aver-
age probability that purchasing power will fall is much larger than the probability that
it will rise; and the average probability that purchasing power will fall by at least 10% is
much larger than the probability that it will rise by at least 10%. This may seem surpris-
ing since there are no explicit plans to change the purchasing power of these benefits,
which, as explained above, are in principle determined by the official poverty line. It might
imply that respondents expect that the benefit level will not be fully indexed so that nom-
inal increases will not be given at all or will not be enough to compensate for inflation.
This implicitly reduces the official poverty line in real terms. In the past, there have also
been time periods in which the nominal amounts of these and other social benefits were
kept constant, reducing their purchasing power. The pessimistic expectations might also
reflect that some respondents are aware of the future removal of the “Partner allowance”,
which, although applying to a limited subgroup of elderly couples only, will reduce the
average benefit per person or per household.
Third, there seem to be no systematic differences between the “10 years from now” and
the “20 years from now” probabilities, although there are some non-negligible differences
in specific months. Perhaps most respondents see 10 or 20 years simply as in the long run
and do not make any distinction.
Figure 1 does not show a strong time trend in the probabilities of an increase, an
increase by 10% or more, or a fall by 10% or more until mid 2010. This may reflect the
fact that the policy debate does not directly concern the level of AOW benefits (the deci-
sion to remove the “Partner allowance” was already made in 1995), only the eligibility age.
On the other hand, a somewhat stronger time trend is found for the probability that ben-
efits will fall in real terms, although even here, the pattern is not completely consistent
and somewhat different for the 10 and 20 years groups. After mid 2010, the probabilities
of a fall and of a fall of at least 10% both increased. Perhaps this is when people started
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to realize that reform plans also included the possibility to claim lower AOW benefits at
an earlier age, or that during times of crisis and government deficits, inflation will not be
fully compensated for. Overall, we can conclude that pessimism has increased since the
beginning of 2008 and particularly since mid 2010.
Figure 2 shows the average answers to the probability questions on occupational pen-
sion levels, separately for the groups who got the “10 years from now” and the “20 years
from now” questions. We find the same asymmetry revealing a general sense of pes-
simism. This is less surprising than for the state benefits, since the debate on keeping
the pension system sustainable in spite of the ageing of the population was already quite
active in 2006.
The trend towards larger pessimism is considerably stronger here than in the expec-
tations concerning AOW benefits. Tax reforms such as abolishing the preferential tax
treatment of many early retirement arrangements (announced in 2005 and implemented
in 2006) may justify increasing pessimism in 2006-2007. Since the financial and economic
crisis, many pension funds have decided not to compensate their clients for inflation and
recently some of them have even announced that they have to lower nominal amounts,
which may well explain the increasing pessimism in the second half of the period. As
before, there are no systematic differences between the 10 and 20 years groups.
Figure 3 shows how expectations concerning the eligibility age for state benefits
changed over time. Here the asymmetry is even larger than for the pension and AOW
benefit levels. The average reported probability that the eligibility age will fall (or will
fall by at least 2 years) is quite small and might be upward biased by reporting errors of
respondents who did not understand the questions or did not answer them seriously. The
average reported probability that the eligibility age will increase over the next ten years
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Figure 2 The probability of changes in the purchasing power of occupational pensions 10 or 20 years
from now.
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Figure 3 The probability of changes in eligibility age for AOW benefits 10 or 20 years from now.
80% in Spring 2012. A similar clear trend towardsmore pessimism can be observed for the
“20 years from now” group. The trend is quite plausible and in line with the announced
reforms.
The figures also reveal that respondents were relatively pessimistic in the first few
months of the survey (May and June 2006). One explanation is the fact that the gov-
ernment largely abolished preferential tax treatment of early retirement benefits in early
2006. Another reason may be that the Social Democrats announced their intention to
reduce the eligibility or generosity of AOW benefits to cope with the increasing costs due
to population ageing. In the months after that, these plans were weakened and other par-
ties expressed disagreement, which is probably why respondents became less pessimistic
over the summer of 2006. Respondents’ optimism rose until the general elections in
November 2006. Shortly after that, several groups revitalized the discussion on increasing
the AOW eligibility age and labour force participation of older workers, and pessimism
increased. Particularly since late 2008, influenced by the budget problems caused by the
crisis, government plans to change the AOW eligibility age took concrete form, and
increasing pessimism seems perfectly justified.
Figure 4 shows the development over time of expectations concerning the average age at
which people will stop working 10 or 20 years from now. The asymmetry is similar to that
for the AOW eligibility age. The average reported probability that the retirement age will
increase over the next ten years rises from about 60% to almost 80% between 2006 and
2012. The trend is similar but somewhat less salient for the “20 years from now” group.
The probability that in the next ten or twenty years the retirement age will rise by two or
more years increases less, from about 50% to about 60% for the ten years case.
The patterns in 2006 are similar to those in Figure 3. People are pessimistic at first
(Summer 2006) but pessimism falls until the general elections in November. In the first
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Figure 4 The probability of changes in the average age at which people will stop working 10 or 20
years from now.
few months of 2007, the new government launched a plan to stimulate labour force par-
ticipation of older workers by making AOW benefits dependent on participation in the
years before the normal retirement age. In response to this, the number of respondents
expecting an increase in the average retirement age rose. The effect disappeared when
the government plans appeared to be unfeasible. In spring 2008 the expected average
retirement age rose again, possibly because some respondents already feared that the
financial crisis would affect the accumulated pension wealth invested by pension funds.
Respondents’ expectations then remained approximately constant until the summer of
2009, but pessimism increased during the more recent period (Fall 2009 - Spring 2012).
The probability questions ask about general events and if everyone would have the same
information set and the same way of forming their subjective distributions (like rational
expectations), there should be no systematic association with respondent characteristics.
We will analyze this for a large set of individual characteristics in multivariate regressions
in the next section. Here we present the relation between the probabilities concerning
changing the eligibility age for state benefits (see Figure 3) with gender (Figure 5) and
age (Figure 6). Figure 5 shows the time pattern for men and women separately. The trend
is almost identical for men and women. In most time periods, the two curves on the
probabilities of postponing eligibility suggest that men are somewhat less pessimistic than
women, but the differences are small.
Figure 6 shows how the subjective probabilities vary with respondent age, combining
data from all available time periods.6 These figures show that pessimism concerning the
state pension eligibility age falls with age. For example, the average percentage probabil-
ity that the state pension eligibility age will be increased is about 60% for respondents of
30 years old, but only about 40% for respondents aged 70. The average probability that
the same eligibility age will rise by at least two years is about 40% for the youngest group
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Figure 6 Expectations concerning the eligibility age for AOW benefits 10 or 20 years from now as a
function of respondent age. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
and only 25% for the oldest age group. A similar age pattern is found for the other ques-
tions (results available upon request from the authors) and the age patterns seem even
stronger than the time trends discussed above. Interpreting the age patterns in terms of
general optimism or pessimism about the future of the pension system, these results sug-
gest the opposite of those of Dominitz and Manski (2005), who find that young people
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have more optimistic expectations on equity returns than older people. There may also
be alternative explanations than age or cohort differences in optimism and pessimism for
some of the age patterns. For example, different age groups have different consumption
patterns. If expected price changes are heterogeneous across consumption commodities,
this may induce differences in which nominal amounts the various age groups think are
necessary to maintain purchasing power. Moreover, there are age and cohort differences
in home ownership rates and the type and amount of mortgage people hold, and expecta-
tions concerning policy reforms in the housing market such as limiting tax deductability
of mortgage interest payments may affect different age groups in different ways. For
example, older people are often renting or have already redeemed most of their mort-
gage, so that they may not incorporate the consequences of less generous tax treatment
of mortgages for the purchasing power of future retirement income.
4 Empirical models of beliefs
In this section, we will assess the impact of respondents’ demographic characteristics on
their reported retirement expectations. We are interested in knowing if some groups in
society are particularity pessimistic or display unwarranted optimism toward retirement.
As emphasized in Section Introduction, there are several reasons why we think this is
important: to test the rational expectations hypothesis and to determine the usefulness
of collecting this type of information at the micro level in future surveys, and to analyze
the potential negative impact of misguided perceptions of the future on well-being for
vulnerable groups in society, in particular through “under-saving.”
4.1 Model specification
From now on we focus our attention on the questions concerning negative outcomes,
since given the current situation of pensions, the negative changes seem more relevant
than changes that would increase the cost of the pension system (as confirmed by the
rather low value for the “optimistic” probabilities in the previous section).Wemodel eight
dependent variables: the answers to the questions concerning any decrease or a decrease
of more than 10% in the generosity of the old age social security benefits (AOW) and
of occupational pensions, and the answers to questions concerning any increase or an
increase of at least two years in the age of eligibility to AOW benefits and of the average
retirement age in the Netherlands.
All dependent variables are subjective probabilities and take values between 0 %-
points and 100 %-points, and a substantial number of respondents used these extremes:
the percentage of zeros varies from 2.2% to 11.9%, and the fraction of 100% answers
varies from 4.6% to 22.5%. We take into account the censored nature of the variables
in our estimations by estimating two-limit Tobit specifications.7 Eight separate models
are used for each of the probability questions concerning the more pessimistic out-
comes (levels of state and occupational pensions lower or at least 10% lower; eligibility
age for state pensions and average retirement age delayed or delayed by at least two
years).
Over time, all respondents were asked to answer the questions up to 15 times, allow-
ing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the respondent level, using panel data
techniques. We therefore use random-effects models.8 This gives the following model
specification (with separate models for each of the eight probabilities):
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0 if P∗it ≤ 0
P∗it if 0 < P∗it < 100
100 if P∗it ≥ 100
(2)
αi|xi1, . . . , xiT ∼ N(0, σ 2α ) (3)





Here P∗it is a latent variable, determined by a vector of explanatory variables xit , an unob-
served individual effect αi and an idiosyncratic error term it . The observed probability
Pit is obtained from P∗it through censoring at both ends, implying positive probabilities of
reporting 0 and 100. The individual effects and error terms are assumed to follow nor-
mal distributions independent of the xit , as in the standard random effects Tobit model.
The model parameters (β , σα and σ) are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood.
Estimates are obtained using Stata.
The same independent variables xit were included in all eight models. First, we include
a set of basic demographic and socio-economic respondent and household characteris-
tics: a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent is a male, age of the respondent,
age squared, a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent lives with a partner. We
control for education using dummies for intermediate education (secondary general or
intermediate vocational) and high education (higher vocational or university), using low
education (primary school only or lower vocational schooling) as the benchmark. To cap-
ture employment status, we include dummy variables for respondents who are retired,
disabled (or partially disabled), unemployed, or homemaker. For workers, we distinguish
between the private and the public sectors, where the latter includes health, education,
and civil servants.9 We included time dummies for each month (except one) in order to
control for macro-economic shocks on beliefs, like the financial and economic crisis. We
also included a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the question concerned a 10-year
horizon and value 1 if it concerned a 20-year horizon.
We controlled for respondents’ income by including their personal log-income as an
explanatory variable. Respondents who reported an income larger thane8,000 per month
were considered as outliers and removed from the sample. We also included in the model
respondents who explicitly refused to answer the income questions or who reported a
value of 0, which may mask non-response. For these cases the value of log-income was set
to 0; dummy variables were added reporting zero income and for (explicit) non-response.
In Table 1, we present the mean values of the explanatory variables in the first month
(May 2006) and in the spring of 2012 (when one third participated eachmonth, so that the
last three months together cover the complete sample). The table shows that the means
of most of the variables are quite stable over time. We also see that very few respon-
dents did not report an income (none in the first month, 10 in the last three months).
Not all respondents always answered the questions, due to refreshment, attrition, or tem-
porary non-participation (e.g., holidays). About 1,300 respondents answered in the first
month and in the last three months, but in total, about 3,810 respondents who took part
in the survey over time were included in the estimation of each equation. Average age is
relatively high, because all respondents of age 25 and older are asked to answer the ques-
tions (with no upper age limit). Median net personal income (zeroes excluded) rises from
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Log. net-inc. (if inc. > 0) 7.165 6.452
Inc. = 0 0.108 0.092
Unk. Inc. 0.024 0.017
Educ. Med. 0.389 0.412






Public sector 0.212 0.255
Home owner 0.680 0.755
In 20 years 0.512 0.510
N 1,309 1,693
Note: Means use respondents included in at least one of the regressions; means are weighted with sample weights
based upon age, gender and education.
e1,500 in the first month to about e1,750 at the end of the survey period; there is no cor-
rection for inflation. The average education level also increases over time. The fraction of
homemakers falls over time, while the number of public sector employees rises. A large
fraction of all workers (almost 20%) are in the public sector, which is defined in a broad
sense, including, for example, the (semi-public) health and education sectors. The home
ownership rises substantially between the two time periods, in line with the rising trend
in the Netherlands over the past twenty years. The dummy “In 20 years” has value 1 if the
questions referred to 20 years from now and 0 otherwise; the time period in the questions
was randomly drawn, independent of all other variables and with equal probabilities for
“10 years” and “20 years” so that by design its ex antemean should be equal to 0.5. The ex
post mean is somewhat different, mainly due to non-response.
4.2 Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.10 Since we estimated the equations
separately, we do not consider the correlations between the error terms or between the
unobserved heterogeneity terms of the different equations.We consider a 5%-significance
level in discussing which variables are significant and insignificant. Note that the mod-
els all explain the subjective probability of a negative outcome, so a positive sign in the
estimates indicates an increase in pessimism if the independent variable increases.11
The results vary across the eight probabilities, but we observe some common patterns.
First, men report significantly lower probabilities when it comes to the four worst-case
scenarios, indicating that men are less pessimistic than women, in line with findings in the
finance literature (Barber and Odean 2001). For example, the estimated probability that
the state benefit eligibility age will rise by at least two years is more than four percentage
points higher for men than for women, keeping other characteristics constant. This is a
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Table 2 Estimation results two-limit tobit models with random effects: probabilities of
negative changes in future generosity of state and occupational pensions
Generosity of AOW Generosity of occupational pension
Less At least 10% less Less At least 10% less
Male -0.966 -4.642*** -1.819 -4.222***
(-0.832) (-4.541) (-1.608) (-4.250)
Partner 2.086** 2.766*** 1.159 1.446
(1.967) (2.912) (1.127) (1.574)
Age 0.911*** 0.660*** 0.272 0.084
(4.195) (3.409) (1.286) (0.447)
Age-sqr./100 -1.281*** -0.830*** -0.682*** -0.312*
(-6.217) (-4.517) (-3.405) (-1.752)
Log. net-inc. 1.094 -0.170 0.116 -1.067*
(1.628) (-0.280) (0.178) (-1.821)
Inc. = 0 6.320 -1.700 -0.570 -6.597*
(1.390) (-0.412) (-0.129) (-1.659)
Unk. Inc. 8.155 6.562 2.455 -0.235
(1.514) (1.343) (0.470) (-0.050)
Educ. Med. 6.026*** 1.812* 4.221*** 0.657
(4.850) (1.649) (3.494) (0.616)
Educ. High 10.908*** 3.910*** 6.687*** 1.133
(8.601) (3.498) (5.422) (1.044)
Self-employed 0.302 2.386 -0.759 0.587
(0.176) (1.559) (-0.456) (0.395)
Retired 1.421 -1.255 0.238 -1.364
(1.141) (-1.116) (0.197) (-1.254)
Disabled -0.336 -0.387 -1.192 0.739
(-0.182) (-0.232) (-0.662) (0.457)
Homemaker 0.256 -1.907 -0.714 -3.495**
(0.163) (-1.349) (-0.468) (-2.559)
Unemployed 1.811 0.734 1.195 1.317
(0.969) (0.435) (0.666) (0.814)
Public sector 1.533 0.183 2.089** 0.702
(1.451) (0.194) (2.041) (0.772)
Homeowner 1.138 -0.877 0.963 -0.788
(1.100) (-0.950) (0.960) (-0.881)
In 20 years -0.135 2.783*** -0.705** 1.718***
(-0.401) (8.940) (-2.164) (5.747)
Constant 29.424*** 35.836*** 48.754*** 50.083***
(4.104) (5.573) (6.990) (8.045)
Num. Ind. 3,806 3,801 3,807 3,805
Num. Obs. 3,6499 36,328 36,621 36,593
ρ 0.463 0.424 0.467 0.432
σα 27.567 23.843 26.943 23.297
σε 29.696 27.793 28.795 26.738
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses.
Stars denote significance: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
much larger difference than the gender difference in Figure 5, where other characteristics
were not controlled for.
Second, respondents with a partner have significantly more pessimistic expectations
concerning generosity and eligibility age of AOW and concerning the average retirement
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Table 3 Estimation results two-limit tobit models with random effects: probabilities of
delays in eligibility to AOWbenefits and average retirement age
Eligibility to AOW General retirement age
Later At least 2 yrs later Later At least 2 yrs later
Male 1.080 -5.126*** -0.031 -5.178***
(0.961) (-4.738) (-0.031) (-5.286)
Partner 2.787*** 2.486** 2.911*** 2.516***
(2.717) (2.490) (3.207) (2.812)
Age -1.149*** -0.996*** -0.199 -0.288
(-5.422) (-4.861) (-1.062) (-1.569)
Age-sqr./100 0.901*** 0.938*** 0.069 0.299*
(4.475) (4.820) (0.389) (1.715)
Log. net-inc. 2.252*** 1.619** 1.730*** 1.686***
(3.464) (2.529) (3.022) (2.964)
Inc. = 0 13.845*** 10.923** 12.917*** 12.261***
(3.152) (2.515) (3.340) (3.179)
Unk. Inc. 16.189*** 13.261*** 13.122*** 14.282***
(3.125) (2.588) (2.873) (3.140)
Educ. Med. 4.218*** -0.146 3.655*** 0.189
(3.505) (-0.125) (3.402) (0.180)
Educ. High 5.262*** -1.509 4.895*** -2.066*
(4.282) (-1.274) (4.455) (-1.930)
Self-employed 0.414 3.228** 0.119 2.277
(0.248) (1.980) (0.081) (1.570)
Retired 4.886*** 1.653 1.627 -0.162
(3.989) (1.390) (1.532) (-0.154)
Disabled -0.103 1.429 -3.742** -0.904
(-0.058) (0.812) (-2.377) (-0.577)
Homemaker 1.392 -1.191 -2.181 -2.414*
(0.917) (-0.799) (-1.631) (-1.817)
Unemployed 3.103* 1.723 2.483 2.987*
(1.738) (0.971) (1.599) (1.915)
Public sector 0.321 0.790 0.078 0.357
(0.317) (0.797) (0.087) (0.403)
Homeowner 2.034** 1.276 1.215 0.515
(2.043) (1.310) (1.371) (0.590)
In 20 years 3.864*** 8.733*** 2.429*** 6.135***
(11.851) (26.768) (8.556) (21.539)
Constant 74.730*** 65.060*** 57.091*** 47.996***
(10.703) (9.577) (9.249) (7.904)
Num. Ind. 3,807 3,806 3,810 3,810
Num. Obs. 36,646 36,611 36,653 36,640
ρ 0.479 0.434 0.488 0.454
σα 26.504 25.299 24.131 23.261
σε 27.641 28.840 24.731 25.502
Dummies for each but the initial time period were included, but are not reported.
t-values in parentheses.
Stars denote significance: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
age. A possible explanation is that couples are more concerned about retirement issues
than singles and therefore pay more attention to the public debate. Another possible
explanation could be that respondents with partners are often secondary earners working
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part-time, for whom income is not a good proxy to financial literacy or interest in financial
matters (see below).
In general, high income individuals more often believe that 10 or 20 years from now,
workers will retire later and the AOW eligibility age will be higher. This view corresponds
with the opinion of “financially literate” individuals. The dummy with value 1 if reported
income is zero or if no income is reported is also significant for the four questions
concerning eligibility and retirement ages. Taking into account that in these cases the log
income variable is set to zero, these estimates imply that non- and zero-reporters are not
very different from those with an average log income.12
Similarly, we find that people with medium and high education report a significantly
higher probability for the four more generic pessimistic questions. The effect is not
significant for the four questions concerning a substantial decrease of “at least 10%” or
“more than two years”. This finding is in line with the notion that pessimism is probably
justified and the higher educated respondents tend to be better informed,more financially
literate, and more often make plans for retirement (cf. Lusardi and Mitchell 2007).
Most of the dummies on employment status are insignificant. Retirees are partic-
ularly pessimistic concerning the age of eligibility for AOW benefits. Unemployed
individuals are somewhat more pessimistic about the AOW eligibility age and the
average retirement age than private sector workers (the omitted category), but the dif-
ferences are only marginally significant. The coefficient on the homemaker dummy is
usually negative and a few times significant, suggesting that homemakers are less pes-
simistic than employees in the private sector. Disability benefit recipients less often
think that the retirement age will rise. Public sector workers are more pessimistic
than private sector workers concerning the future purchasing power of occupational
pensions.
Age generally has a significant effect and themarginal effect of age is usually negative for
most of the sample. Where age is significant, the age pattern is typically decreasing over
the age range in the sample (25 and older) so that in general, keeping other characteristics
constant, younger individuals are more pessimistic concerning the pension system than
older people. This is in line with the age patterns in Figure 6, where other characteristics
were not kept constant. This finding cannot be explained from the knowledge or general
optimism arguments that we used above. Perhaps it relates to the fact that, in spite of the
fact that the questions explicitly mention “10 years from now” or “20 years from now”
respondents often answer the questions thinking about their own pension provision at
the time of their retirement, which will probably be less generous for younger people than
for those who are already approaching retirement.
The only significant difference between home owners and renters is that home owners
are more pessimistic concerning the age of AOW eligibility. This is somewhat unexpected
given the argument given in the previous section that expectations concerning housing
market reforms may have different consequences for the disposable income of owners
and renters (see, Time trends and age patterns in pension expectations section).
Finally, there is a significant positive effect of asking questions concerning a 20-year
horizon rather than a 10-year horizon, indicating that respondents are more pessimistic
concerning pension provisions 20 years from now than concerning pensions 10 years
from now. This could be expected from the figures in the previous section and is in line
with the fact that the effect of population ageing on, for example, the ratio between the
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65+ and 65- population sizes, is expected to increase further during the next twenty years
(see, for example, van Duin and Garssen 2011).
The estimates of the standard deviations at the bottom of the table (σα for the individual
effects; σ for the error terms) indicate that there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity:
between 40 and 50 percent of the total unexplained variation in the reported probabilities
can be ascribed to time persistent individual effects (as indicated by ρ = σ 2α/(σ 2α + σ 2 )).
This also answers the second question we raised at the beginning of this section: the
covariates used in our model do not capture the heterogeneity in beliefs completely, and
the reported probabilities provide additional information – if they would just add noise,
we would expect σα to be small compared to σ . This is in line with the existing literature
emphasizing the value of subjective probabilities in survey data (see, e.g., Manski 2004),
reinforcing the idea that eliciting information of expectations is important for researchers
interested in questions related to retirement and pensions.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed expectations of the Dutch population of ages 25 and older concerning
the system of income provision after retirement. The recent trends and policy discussions
that seem to justify the expectation that future pensions will be less generous in terms
of pension levels, eligibility ages, or both, are reflected in the trend in expectations, but
only to a limited extent. For example, during our observation window from Summer 2006
to Spring 2012 it has become very likely that AOW eligibility will be postponed from
age 65 to age 67 at some stage in the next 20 years. Accordingly, the average probability
that this age will rise by at least two years has gradually risen from about 50 % to about
70% only. Expectations seem to adjust only gradually to the new reality and as a conse-
quence, average pension system expectations of the Dutch population have probably been
too optimistic during the past few years. Our micro-data also revealed substantial hetero-
geneity across and within socio-economic groups, suggesting that the average optimism
is due to the “over-optimism” of a substantial subsample, whereas others may well have
rational expectations.
The finding that men are less pessimistic than women is consistent with findings in
existing studies in a different context. The fact that richer (and higher educated) individu-
als are significantly more pessimistic concerning some aspects of retirement than poorer
respondents is in line with a positive association between socio-economic status and
knowledge of the public debate on pension provisions. The finding that younger individ-
uals are more pessimistic than older respondents may relate to the fact that respondents
often answer the questions thinking about their own pension provision at the time when
they retire (in spite of the wording of the questions).
From an economic policy point of view, the results we have obtained in models that
relate expectations to socio-economic characteristics contain both good and bad news,
under the assumption that pessimism is justified and the more pessimistic respondents
are also the most realistic. That younger individuals are aware of the possible negative
changes in pensions is certainly comforting news, as long as they will adapt their saving
behaviour accordingly. The younger individuals, who are likely to witness changes to the
pension system, have time and room to adapt their employment career and their life-
cycle saving plans to this new reality, and canminimize an unwanted decline of well-being
at retirement.
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On the other hand, we view the fact that poorer individuals tend to be more optimistic
as bad news. The poorer individuals depend more on the old age social security benefits
than their richer counterparts, and are therefore more affected by a reduction in the gen-
erosity of these benefits. For the poorest among them, it might not make a lot of difference
to anticipate the changes, as they are not able to save for retirement and their income
will probably consist almost solely of social security anyhow. However, not anticipating
the policy changes could have a larger negative impact on the well-being of the middle
class, who are likely to save too little under erroneous beliefs concerning the future. An
unrealistic view of the future of public pensions could have important welfare effects for
these respondents.
Future research opportunities remain. Adding more waves of data will help to better
identify the long term consequences of the financial and economic crisis. It also seems
interesting to analyze whether these expectations are associated with current decisions
on, for example, retirement savings. In addition, some methodological improvements are
possible. First, we already mentioned that the full information on individual behaviour
provided by the multidimensional panel structure is not fully exploited. We could con-
trol for general pessimism by estimating the equations jointly, and by allowing the terms
of individual heterogeneity to be correlated among individuals. Another interesting step
would be to jointly analyze the beliefs of respondents within a household, and to assess if
unwarranted optimism or pessimism is contagious among partners. Finally, since respon-
dents tend to answer our probability questions using focal answers such as “50 percent,”
the assumptions needed for the Tobit model may not be justified, and it seems worthwhile
to check whether results are robust using a more general model that explicitly accounts




2The January 2012 amounts (before taxes and including vacation allowance) are e1,107
for singles and e1,524 for couples.
3This randomization was independent across waves, so the same person could get the
questions with 10 years in one wave and with 20 years in another wave; in a given wave,
all questions for a given respondent had 10 years, or they all had 20 years.
4We did not feel it was useful to ask about the eligibility age for occupational pensions,
because with increasing flexibility and actuarially fair choices, the formal eligibility age
can be quite low but with unattractively low pension benefits this is not very meaningful.
5The figures are weighted with sample weights to correct for unit non-response related
to gender, age, and education.
6Estimations obtained using local linear regression with Gaussian kernel and a band-
width of 2 years.
7We do not address the issue of possible focal answers (see, e.g., Fischhoff and Bruine de
Bruin 1999, or Hudomiet et al. 2011), since heaping at 0, 50 or 100 does not seem such
a large problem in these data, with the percentage of 50-50 answers varying between 12
and 17 percent.
8Since many socioeconomic characteristics (education, gender) hardly vary over time we
did not pursue using fixed effects models.
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9We also estimated specifications with dummies for different parts of the private sector
(manufacturing, construction, trade and transport, financial industry, other services) but
found almost all of these were insignificant.
10Time dummies are included but their coefficients are not reported, since their pattern
very much resembles the time trends in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4.
11The estimates of the slope coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects on the
expected subjective probabilities, due to the non-linearity of the model. The marginal
effect of a covariate is equal to the estimated parameter times the probability of being
uncensored; for the average respondent, this probability varies from 0.747 to 0.865 over
the eight questions.
12The average log income is about 7.25, so the coefficients on the dummies should be
compared with 7.25 times the coefficient on log income.
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